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AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHODESIAN REFERENDUM,
1922
M. E laine L ee 
Johannesburg
T h e  s u c c e s s  o f  the Resposible Government Association in the referendum 
of October 1922, in which the electorate supported Responsible Government 
in preference to Union with South Africa, is clearly a significant turning- 
point in Southern Rhodesian history. There has been little analysis, however, 
of how and why this result came about,' and the vote for Responsible Gov­
ernment has simply been attributed to the natural outcome of ‘British 
instincts’ and Imperial sentiment. These factors undoubtedly contributed to 
some extent, but were not the prime causes underlying the settlers’ decision.
The first demand for Reponsible Government was made in 1912, but pro­
ponents of this policy were defeated in the election of 1914.2 The Rhodesian 
League of 1912 and the supporters of the ‘Common Platform’ of 1914 were 
mainly representatives of farming who saw Responsible Government as the 
only means by which the injustices they felt they suffered could be rectified. 
These injustices were the liabilities inherent in land titles and the mining 
laws, which gave prospectors and miners considerable rights on privately- 
owned land. The British South Africa Company’s reliance on mining for 
its principal source of revenue meant that however sympathetically it might 
otherwise consider the agricultural sector’s grievances, amelioration of condi­
tions which interfered with mining ‘title’ was almost impossible in view o'f 
opposition from mining organizations. Yet despite the failure of the Responsi­
ble Government movement of 1912-14, it laid the ground for future success. 
The size of the vote it attracted in 1914 led the Colonial Office to include a 
significant clause in the Supplemental Charter of 1915. This allowed for the 
implementation of Responsible Government before the ten-year extension of 
the Company’s administrative rights elapsed in 1924, should an absolute 
majority of the Legislative Council demand it.
' The only detailed account is by M. A. G. Davies, ‘Incorporation in the Union of 
South Africa or Self-Government : Southern Rhodesia’s Choice, 1922’ (Univ. of South 
Africa, unpubl. M.A. thesis. 1963) summarized under the same title in University of 
South Africa, Communication No. C58, 1965, and very briefly in ‘A day of decision : 
27 October. 1922’. in Proceedings of the Central Africa Historical Association Conference 
September 1966, Part I I  (Salisbury, the Central Africa Historical Assoc., Local Series 
Pamphlet No. 19. 1967), 1-6. His account, however, deals mainly with the Civil Service 
and Railway vote, and in the latter case is inaccurate.
a For more detail on this and the background to Responsible Government, see M. 
Elaine Lee, ‘The origins of the Rhodesian Responsible Government movement’, Rhodesian 
History (1975). 6, 33-52; ‘Politics and Pressure Groups in S. Rhodesia, 1898-1923’ 
(Univ. of London, unpubl. Ph.D thesis, 1974), ch.6.
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The outbreak of war in 1914 interrupted internal political movements in 
Rhodesia, but these revived in 1917 after the Company itself introduced con­
troversy by advocating amalgamation of Northern with Southern Rhodesia. 
As a result, farming leaders formed the Responsible Government Associa­
tion (R.G.A.) after the Congress of the Rhodesia Agricultural Union in 1917. 
The appeal of this Association might once again have been limited to the 
agricultural (and to some extent the commercial) sector, but the investigations 
into the ownership of land (instigated, significantly, by the Rhodesian League 
and the Rhodesia Agricultural Union) led to the decision of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in favour of the Crown in the Land Case of 
1918. This decision broadened the electoral appeal of the R.G.A., for the 
Company, having lost what it had considered its principal asset in the country, 
no longer had an incentive to continue its administration. It refused to finance 
further deficits in the country’s revenue, which made it quite clear to the 
settlers that if the country was to be administered on its own resources, they 
might as well have the advantage of so running it themselves.
The supp'  . „ the R.G.A. became obvious in the 1920 elections. Led 
by Sir Charles -op’ m (who formerly opposed farming movements, and had 
for many yearv ~*;n lawyer to the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines), it won 
12 of the 13 seats, losing one only as a result of a split vote. Pressure for the 
attainment of Responsible Government was therefore intense from this date.
Although the foundations of the Responsible Government movements 
were laid well before 1922, this in itself does not fully explain the greater 
appeal for this course over Union. It the 1920 elections the issues were less 
clear than in the referendum. In place of a straightforward contest between 
Responsible Government and Union, other alternatives, in the form of Re­
presentative Government or continuation of the Charter, were offered in 1920. 
The success of the Responsible Government Association in 1920 can be seen 
in many instances to have been a vote rather against the continuation of 
Chartered rule than for a particular form of government to succeed it, es­
pecially as only four Unionist candidates stood in the 1920 elections. Far 
greater effort was put into the campaign for Union in 1922; and although 
it failed, 5 989 votes were secured, representing 40,6 per cent of the electorate, 
a figure slightly higher than the overall ‘opposition’ vote in 1920 when in the 
face of the R.G.A. and Labour candidates supporting Responsible Govern­
ment, it secured 39,4 per cent.3
The most interesting features of the referendum results lie not only in 
the failure of the Union cause, but in the changes in the voting pattern between 
1920 and 1922, despite the apparent similarity of the above figures. A detailed 
analysis of the 1920 figures has not been possible, but the success of the R.GA
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3 F. M. G. Wilson (ed.), Source Book of Parliamentary Elections and Referenda i 
Southern Rhodesia 1898-1962 (Salisbury, Univ. Coll, of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963]
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can quite clearly be attributed to farming and Afrikaner support, the white 
Labour and clerical vote. Most Labour and white-collar workers continued 
to support Responsible Government in 1922, but to a large degree farming 
and Afrikaner support declined. The apparent attractions of Responsible 
Government or Union had not changed significantly in two years, and the 
following analysis makes it clear that various economic factors underlay the 
decision of various sectors of the community to support one side or the other. 
Such factors were less important in 1920, when the future form of government 
was less certain and more distant.
The first step taken by the newly-elected Legislative Council members 
in 1920 was to request Responsible Government in terms of the Supplemental 
Charter. Lord Milner, Secretary of State from 1919 to 1921, prevaricated; his 
reply in December 1920 suggested a delay until after the 1924 elections, when, 
if the electorate should still support Responsible Government, it would be 
granted. This recommendation was rejected by Coghlan, although the offer 
a development loan of £150 000 per annum was welcomed.4 The loan 
a » altered the position of the Company, whose main reason for wishing to 
_^1nquish the reins of administration had been to avoid further financial com­
mitment in the country. Now that funds had become available from another 
source, the Company preferred to prolong its administration in order to 
allow time for a conversion of public opinion to Union, for entry into the 
Union gave the Company its best chance for a satisfactory financial settle­
ment.5 The joint interest of the Colonial Secretary and the Company in such 
a delay was shortlived, for in February 1921 Winston Churchill became 
Colonial Secretary. This change was not immediately seen as unfavourable 
to Company policy; Malcolm commented on the new incumbent that:
While he may not be hostile, [he] is not likely to be particularly 
sympathetic towards us. On the other hand he is pretty sure to be 
in sympathy with Union aspirations, as he will regard the Union 
as the fruit of what he and Elgin did in 1906 and 1907.®
Churchill, on taking office, delegated responsibility on the issue of Rhodesian 
Responsible Government to a committee, to which he appointed Lord Buxton, 
the former High Commissioner in South Africa and perhaps the most sym­
pathetic of all Colonial Office officials to Responsible Government. In May 
1921 publication of his report gave a considerable boost to Coghlan’s party, 
and was seen as a setback by both the Company and Rhodesian Unionists,7 
for the demand for Responsible Government was acknowledged, although it
l r 4 iThe] RhVodesia] Her[ald1, 24 Jan. 1921, Reply of the Elected Members.
& * Histtorical] M[anuscript]s Collfectioln, CH8/2 [Papers of Sir Francis Percy Drum- 
Ebond Chaplin : Correspondence and Other Papers], 2/6 (By Correspondent : P. L. Cell, §14 Oct. 1918-6 Jan. 1923), Gell to Chaplin, 7 May 1921.
(• «Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11 [D. O. Malcolm, 16 Sept, 1910-9 Apr. 19291, 
(Malcolm to Chaplin. 28 Ian. 1921.
7 Ibid., Malcolm to Chaplin, 12 May 1921.
was recommended that the issue first be placed before the public in a 
referendum, suggested for early in 1922.®
The Rhodesia Union Association attemped to make the most of the 
Buxton Report by suggesting that the financial liabilities that this (and the 
Cave Award) would impose on the country were unbearable, but in fact 
Coghlan, whose party had now been joined by the Company’s former 
Treasurer, Sir Francis Newton,9 felt that they would well be able to stand 
up under the estimated debt of £2 000 000.
The Report was also seen as a setback by Smuts. Like Chaplin and the 
Company, he believed that given time Rhodesia would opt for Union, but the 
proposed referendum was a ‘for or against’ issue on Responsible Government 
and did not give them any time. He therefore suggested a referendum em­
bracing all issues, including Union, although this placed Churchill in an 
awkward position since Union bad been resoundingly defeated in tbe 1920 
elections.'0 However, Smuts was supported by the local Union Association, 
which had K  ncouraged by his increased majority in the February 1921 
elections af \  th amalgamation of the South African and Unionist parties. 
Ibis was coh. .Id to have allayed Rhodesian fears of Afrikaner Nationalism 
(although it was not unobserved in Rhodesia that Smuts’s gains were at the 
expense of Labour rather than the Nationalists), and consequently the Rho­
desian Unionists claimed to have won widespread support with a reputed 
membership of 1 500 in June 1921." However Coghlan rejected a motion by 
Fletcher that the deputation to London proposed by Buxton should request 
that Union be included as an issue in the referendum,12 but as a result of 
widespread support for the Union Association’s subsequent petition, signed 
by 8 104 settlers,13 Churchill successfully pressed the matter on the deputa­
tion’s arrival in London. The deputation’s subsequent success with the Colonial 
Office was also seen as a setback by Smuts, who commented:
Coghlan has played his cards well and beaten both the Imperial 
Government and the British South Africa Company and I most 
certainly don’t want him to beat me . . .  It will never do to let him 
know he’s bested the Colonial Office and Chartered Company else 
he’ll sit down in sheer stubbornness and try to beat me.1'*
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e Great Britain, South Africa. First Report of a Committee Appointed by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to Consider Certain Questions Relating to Rhodesia [Cmd. 
12731.paras 33. 39, 45 (H.C. 1921 (I), xxiv, 719).
9 Rh. Her., 20 May 1921. Newton’s conversion was a surprise to the Company, who 
attributed it to the Buxton Report and the influence of the Imperial Secretary, Stanley 
(who was felt to have influenced the Report as well), Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11, 
Malcolm to ChaDlin, 7 June 1921.
10 R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948 (London, Macmillan, 
1972V 60.
"  Rh. Her., 12 June 1921.
|2 Southern Rhodesia, Debates in the Legislative Council during the Second Session 
of the Seventh' Council, 25th April to 27th May. 1921 (Salisbury, Argus [1921] ), 25 
May, 1070ff.
13 Rh. Her., 8 July and 25 Aug. 1921.
14 Quoted in Hist. Mss Colin. C H 8/2/2/9  [J. G. MacDonald], McDonald to Chaplin,
11 i l l H  l O O l  * J
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Although the Rhodesian press and Rhodesia Union Association did their 
best to belittle the draft letters patent on the delegation’s return in January 
1922 and to make capital particularly out of McChlery’s unenthusiastic 
attitude,,s the draft constitution nevertheless was well received by the R.G.A.’s 
supporters and Fletcher received a vote of no confidence at Wankie after de­
nigrating the terms.16 Despite the defection of the former R.G.A. stalwart, 
McChlery, who was later asked by Coghlan to resign from the party,17 the 
Unionists’ only hope now lay in the forthcoming deputation to Smuts to 
obtain the terms for Union, since it was obvious that only the most generous 
terms for entry into the Union would be able to sway public opinion.
The delegates, especially the Unionists, returned well satisfied with the 
willingness of South Africa to meet Rhodesia’s needs, but they had obtained 
no definite terms. The subsequent delay in obtaining the official terms of 
entry was probably part of Smuts’s plan to delay the referendum (as well 
as the difficulties experienced in negotiations with the Company) to give the 
Unionists time to build up support,19 but his hand was forced when Coghlan 
himself introduced the Referendum Ordinance late in the Legislative Council 
session, despite the absence of the Union terms, in order to avoid just such 
a delay.
The date of the referendum was set for 27 October, and once the Union 
terms were obtained in July, campaigning by both parties started in earnest. 
Chaplin had suggested to Smartt earlier in the year that if the Rhodesia 
Union Association ‘were to receive a little encouragement I imagine they 
would take a more active line’,19 and such ‘encouragement’ was received 
from both South Africa and the B.S.A. Company, as well as from local mining 
companies.20 Malcolm wrote:
I am glad that J. G. McDonald and his pro-Union friends are show­
ing more activity . . .  I think we shall have to give him some help 
quietly through the Goldfields. It would not do for us to appear in 
the matter.21
The latter sentiment was one with which the Colonial Office was in accord, 
for incorporation into the Union might be jeopardized if Rhodesians suspected 
Company pressure. ‘The British thus fervently hoped that the Company would
i*Rh. Her., 20 Jan. and 24 Feb. 1922.
Ibid., 17 Feb. 1922.
17 Hist. Mss Colin, RH8 [Papers of the Rhodesian Party (formerly Responsible Gov­
ernment Association) ], 1 [Correspondence and Other Papers], 1 [1922 Referendum, 
3 June 1919 - 28 Feb. 1924], 1 [Bulawayo, Mar. - Dec. 1922], Coghlan to McChlery, 25
May 1922.
'® R C /3/l [Resident Commissioner : Correspondence : General], 121 (1922), 481, 
H[igh] C[ommissioner] to Secretary of State, 9 June 1922.
19 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/1 [General, 9 Feb. 1896 - 18 Nov. 1933], Chaplin to 
Smartt, 28 Feb. 1921.
2° D. J. Murray, The Governmental System of Southern Rhodesia (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press. 1970). 124.
21 Hist. Mss Colin. CH8/2/2/11, Malcolm to Chaplin, 14 Apr. 1921 and 27 July 
1922; Malcolm to McDonald, 17 Aug. 1922 end. in Malcolm to Chaplin, 17 Aug. 1922.
not, with their usual clumsiness, engineer a press campaign in favour of 
entry to the Union.’22 Such a press campaign was indeed organized, despite 
assertions by the Rhodesian Printing & Publishing Company’s biographer 
to the contrary,23 but in fact the strongly biased reporting failed to influence 
the electorate to any great extent.
South African aid was not limited to financial and press support. Talks 
were held with prominent South African Party politicians in South Africa, 
while a South African Party agent visited Rhodesia ‘to help all he can . . . and 
give you all some most useful pointers and lay out propaganda at which I
believe he is very good’.24
The Rhodesian Union Association’s policy at the time of the London 
deputation had been to attempt to subvert the loyalty of Responsible Gov­
ernment members of the deputation,25 and McChlery’s subsequent doubts and 
resignation from the R.G.A. were perhaps the result of such tactics. Attempts 
were also made„>t’ influential South Africans such as Abe Bailey and Joel 
to win Coghlr , o» by promise of a South African Cabinet post,26 but 
such attempts "'Tp ,opeless for Coghlan’s antipathy to Union was unlikely 
to be overcome by isuch means.27 The Association also hoped to use the con­
siderable ability and influence of Smuts himself; McDonald insisted that ‘we 
must get Smuts up here early next year. By then we’ll be ready and he’ll carry 
the “wobblers”.’28 He also warned Smuts against disbelieving in Coghlan’s 
sincerity in wanting Responsible Government; too late to stop the attempted 
‘purchase’ of Coghlan and perhaps a point that Smuts was already aware of 
himself.
Much was made of the provisions of the draft letters patent and the 
Union terms during the referendum campaign, but it is probable that their 
details played a relatively minor role in deciding the electorate. As with the 
1920 elections, Unionists made much of the difficulties they imagined the 
country would experience financially under Responsible Government, while 
R.G.A. supporters felt that ten representatives in the South African Assembly 
(a generous offer considering the small size of the Rhodesian electorate) 
would in no way protect purely Rhodesian interests, or compensate for their 
loss of independence. More general interests, such as the fear of Afrikaner 
nationalism, the influx of ‘poor white’ settlers, loss of labour (for although
76. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHODESIAN REFERENDUM, 1 9 2 2
22  Hyam, The Failure, 63, quoting Buxton to Smuts, 17 Apr. 1921.
23 W. D. Gale, The Rhodesian Press . . . (Salisbury, Rhodesian Printing and Publish­
ing, 1962), 127.
24 Hist. Mss Colin. CH8/2/1, J. G. McDonald to L. Ludlow of Goldfields Rhodesia 
Co. Ltd., 7 July 1921 end. in McDonald to Chaplin, 7 July 1921.
a5 Ibid.. McDonald to Chaplin. 8 Nov. 1921.
26 J. P, R. Wallis, One Man’s Hand : The Story of Sir Charles Coghlan .. . (London, 
Longmans, Green, 19501, 176-7.
27 Coghlan was also aware of the unpopularity of Union : RC /3/1/87 (1920), 458, 
Rfesident] CCommissioner] to H. C., 29 Apr. 1920 : ‘Whatever his political opponents 
say of Sir Charles, they cannot honestly charge him with being ignorant of public opinion’.
28 Hist. Mss Colin, C H 8/2/2/9, MacDonald to Chaplin, 30 June 1921.
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South Africa guaranteed that no recruiting for the Rand mines would take 
place north of 22°S latitude, it was obvious that Rhodesia would no longer 
be able to stop the flow of voluntary African labour to the higher-paying 
Rand), and the higher income tax rates prevailing in South Africa, swayed 
many people to support Responsible Government.29 Furthermore, while Smuts 
offered generous development loans, financial security was not certain with 
Union either, for as Sir Lewis Michell commented:
We [in South Africa] are now reaping the harvest of ten years extra­
vagance. The railway position is as bad as it can be and it will 
take a long period to equalize revenue and expenditure, especially 
as railway rates have reached their maximum, while the running 
costs can only be substantially curtailed by the loyal assistance of 
the operating and office staffs and it seems clear that this cannot 
be expected . . . Judging from the ill success of our last loan in 
London we shall find it difficult to borrow further large sums in 
that market until we put our house in order. Fresh taxation seems 
inevitable and an increased income tax is almost certain . . . Re­
trenchment and higher taxation may make Smuts unpopular . . . 
Smuts is a good fighter but has his work cut out to win through.30
Similarly, it was not the actual provisions of the draft letters patent that 
,nionists found fault with, but rather the fear that the ‘wild men’ of the 
R.G.A. would ruin the country by taxing companies to the detriment of the 
mining and commercial industries. British loyalists of both convictions were 
equally convinced that imperial interests would best be served by their parti­
cular course.
Table I3'
REFERENDUM : ESTIMATE OF VOTING
Occupation
Estimate 
of Votes 
to be Cast 
%
Regis­
tered
Voters For R.G.
% N
For
%
Union
N
Public Services 75 1 784 75 1003 25 335
Professional 60 540 50 162 50 162
Mining 60 1 586 60 570 40 381
Agriculture 55 3 050 40 672 60 1005
Industries 60 1 248 80 599 20 150
Commerce 60 2075 80 995 20 250
Commercial Services 55 620 80 272 20 69
Railways 75 1 370 85 872 1532 155
Independent 60 80 50 24 50 24
M ales 62 12 353 76 5 169 33 2 531
F emales 60 6 457 75 2 905 25 969
TOTAL 62 18 810 70 8 074 30 3 500
29 The Independent. ?6 Auer. 1022. R. G. A. Manifesto.
30 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/12 (Sir Lewis Michell, 4 Apr. 1914 - 5 June 1923), 
Michell to Chaplin, 1 Dec. 1921
3' RC/3/1/125 [1922], 785. R.C. to H. C., 9 Oct. 1922.
3* This estimate was increased (and the proportion in favour of Responsible Govern­
ment reduced) after propaganda by South Africa Railways in October.
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The interests of each occupational sector were affected differently by 
the alternatives, and the voting was expected to follow occupational patterns 
to a great extent (Table I). The Resident Commissioner estimated that 
voting would favour Responsible Government by 70 per cent, with 30 per 
cent for Union, and also estimated the percentage vote from each sector. In 
fact this considerably underestimated the total percentage poll, which was 78 
per cent in place of his estimate of 62 per cent, while the majority in favour 
of Responsible Government was lower than expected, 59,43 per cent. How­
ever, the more interesting aspect of the Resident Commissioner’s analysis 
is in the distribution of votes from the various sectors, for it would appear 
that to a certain extent the split between Responsible Government and 
Unionist supporters followed this estimate, despite the overestimate in favour 
of the former, but with the major exception of the Railways group. Although 
it has been asserted frequently that the railway vote went to Responsible 
Government,33 this was not the case; the majority appear to have voted for 
Union.
The occupat: ' of the settler population in 1921 have been estimated 
as follows as j ,cen ge of the working population:34
Public , .<les 12
Professions 3
Mining 15
Agriculture 27
Industry 11
Commerce/Finance 16
Railways/Communications 12
Commercial Services 4
Although it would appear that the agricultural sector was the largest, and 
therefore potentially the most influential group, a more accurate assessment 
for the purposes of this paper is to separate the Labour class from their em­
ployment categories. The majority of men employed in the mining industry 
were artisans, and their vote, which in earlier years had tended to follow the 
lead set by employers to a large extent, did not go the way mining magnates 
would have liked in 1920 and 1922. The ‘Mining’ proportion can therefore 
be reduced from 15 to a more probable 2 per cent, the remainder together with 
the majority of those in the group ‘Industry’ forming a new category of 
‘Labour’ which totalled approximately 24 per cent of the male population. 
The ‘Railways’ sector could logically have been included in this new artisan 
or Labour class but for the fact that the railway vote at the last minute 
did not follow the pattern of the rest of the Labour group. Table II gives the 
distribution of voters within constituencies, based on an analysis of the 1922 
voters rolls.
33 Hyam, The Failure, 68; L. H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia . . . (London, 
Chatto & Windus, 19651. 241; L. H. Gann and M. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia . . ■ 
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1964), 60.
34 Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Director of Census regarding the European Census 
taken on 3rd May, 1921 (Sessional Papers, A.13, 1922), 18 (calculations by Dr B. A. 
Kosmin).
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Table / / ”
ANALYSIS OF THE 1922 VOTERS LIST
District
Farm­
ing Mining
Art­
isan
Public
Service
Rail­
ways
Com­
merce
Profes- 
sional/cler- 
Other icalsB
Bulawayo
District 350 152 210 157 52 171 271
North 13 39 268 206 68 322 279 526
South 8 24 413 83 339 148 336 386
Eastern 418 90 270 159 191 160 336
Gwelo 386 107 112 116 102 114 266
Hartley 68 398 42 92 17 120 103
Marandellas 744 35 13 63 39 54 103
Midlands 462 285 61 93 36 119 101
Northern 710 432 130 87 23 84 154
Salisbury
District 422 94 180 306 28 190 394
Town 25 15 275 253 160 406 326 285
Victoria 683 402 75 140 21 139 142
Western 458 258 149 121 189 114 193
The combined mining and artisan vote makes the Labour vote numerically 
superior in the Bulawayo District, Bulawayo South, and Hartley districts, 
and second only to the farming vote in the Eastern, Midlands, Northern 
Victoria and Western districts, whilst also forming substantial blocks in the 
urban constituencies. Table III shows the preponderance of the Labour vote 
in comparison with the order of the majority achieved in favour of Res­
ponsible Government. 35*
35 I am grateful to Dr J. M. MacKenzie for assistance in the compilation of this 
Table; for full bibliographical details of the voters rolls, see below, R. S. Roberts, ‘An 
historical bibliography of voters lists in Southern Rhodesia : Part I, 1899-1922, 111
as The Professional/Clerical categories were separated only in urban constituencies.
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Table III 
LABOUR VOTE
Districts in 
Order of 
Labour Strength
For
Responsible
Government
%
Districts in Order 
of Responsible 
Government Majority
For
Responsible
Government
%
Hartley 66,52 Bulawayo North 67,93
Bulawayo South 63,97 Hartley 66,52
Bulawayo District 64,98 Bulawayo District 64,98
Northern 60,34 Bulawayo South 63,97
Victoria 51,69 Salisbury Town 63,81
Western 59,32 Northern 60,34
Eastern 57,48 Western 59,32
Midlands 51,94 Eastern 57,48
Bulawayo North 67,93 Gwelo 57,34
Salisbury Town 63,81 Salisbury District - 57,33
Salisbury District 57,33 Midlands 51,94
Gwelo 57,34 Victoria 51,69
Marandellas 49.43 Marandellas 49,43
With the exception of the Midlands and Victoria constituencies, the electoral 
districts with the highest proportion of Labour voters also returned large 
majorities in favour of Responsible Government.
The organization of Labour in unions, and the growing awareness of their 
separate needs as a class are largely responsible for the fact that their 
vote in the referendum, as in the 1920 elections, can be seen as a separate 
entity, rather than included in employment categories. The interests of 
artisans in the mining sector were not those of the managerial class, and, as 
Chaplin was to comment, somewhat wistfully:
Loyalty to employers in these matters is a thing of the past . . .
The feeling on the part of the Trade Unionists and kindred ele­
ments is that as most of the better class people —■ merchants, re­
presentatives of large companies, and employers generally — were 
for Union, their proper course was to vote the other way.37
The one exception to this rule is in the Midlands district, where the farming 
vote was the major factor in the relatively low proportion in favour of Res­
ponsible Government (as in the Victoria district), but where an element of 
‘loyalty’ remained. The bulk of the voters in the Midlands were from the 
three villages: Enkeldoorn, the centre of a primarily Afrikaans farming area; 
Umvuma, a mixed farming and mining area; and Que Que, a mining centre. 
Table IV shows that Enkeldoorn and Umvuma returned Union majorities, 
though Que Que voted for Responsible Government. Since Umvuma had a 
large mining population, this result is surprising, until the influence of
3 7  Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/1, Chaplin to Smuts, 30 Oct. 1922.
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Table IV  30*3 *
VOTING ANALYSIS : MIDLANDS DISTRICT
For
R.G.
For
Union
No. of 
Voters Mining. Artisan Farming Other
Midlands 550 509 1157 285 61 462 349
Enkeldoorn 80 133 100 1 13 115* 74
Umvuma 147 189 262 143 8 90* 95
Qus Que 323 187 313 141 36 100* 135
^Estimated figures, as the majority of farmers .list farm names rather than village 
districts as their addresses in the voters rolls.
Willoughby’s Consolidated Company is brought into consideration, for 
Umvuma is situated within the vast Central Estates, Willoughby’s owned 
not only the greater proportion of the stands and buildings and controlled 
rents and rates but also owned the mining properties within the district, which 
were then leased to tributors and small-workers. The reliance of the bulk of 
the population on this Company for their livelihood is a partial explanation 
of the vote, although the farming vote would probably have been for Union 
without the influence of Willoughby’s.
In other districts attempts were occasionally made to influence the voting 
of employees, for example at Wankie Colliery, where the General Manager, 
A. R. Thomson, an active Unionist until 1924, secured the resignation of the 
local R.G.A. secretary.39 A further incident was reported from Banket of 
instructions received from a London Board for staff at a local mine to vote 
for Union. 40 It is noticeable that voting at some of the smaller mines (the 
Antelope, Fred, Jessie and Legion mines) went in favour of Union (Table V), 
although usually by a small majority; but whether this indicates pressure 
from management or personal inclination is impossible to estimate. Certainly 
J. G. McDonald considered that insufficient pressure was brought to bear by 
employers.4' At larger mining centres as well as several small mines, voting 
favoured Responsible Government.
30 This and the following Tables giving the voting analysis are based on an analysis 
of the noil by R. G. A. Polling Agents, The Independent, 3 Nov. 1922 (incomplete
returns) and actual polling-station returns for some districts, [The] Bullawayo]
Chronlicle], 8 Nov. 1922. Sufficient information is given between them to cover most
districts. Occupational breakdowns are from voters lists, for reference to which, see above,
n.35.
The discrepancy between the total number of voters registered for the station and actual
votes recorded is due to voters from farms and outlying areas casting their votes at the 
village polling station.
39 Hist. Mss Colin, NE1/1/1 [Papers of Sir Francis James Newton : Correspondence : 
Sir Charles Coghlan, 13 Nov. 1922-24 Aug. 1927], Coghlan to Newton, 5 Mar. 1923.
40 Hist. Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/9  [Shamva, 26 June - 16 Oct. 1922], R.G.A. Banket to
R.G.A. Salisbury, 14 Oct. 1922.
«i Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11, McDonald to Malcolm, 13 Nov. 1922.
Table V
VOTING ANALYSIS : MINES
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Polling
Station
For
R.G.
For
Union
Un-
known*2
Mining/
Artisan Farming Railways Other
Antelope 10 15 42 1 ____ 16
Fred Mine 28 29 42 — — 29
Jessie Mine 10 18 23 — __ 5
Legion Mine 8 10 4 — — —
Wankie 152 20 164 47 139 116
Cam & Motor 105 55 135* 20* 1 6
Shabani 100 60 86 3 — 64
Tafuna 20 16 7 41 10 — 2
Shamva Mine 161 120 17 270 40 ------ . 104
Penhalonga 89 54 11 90 7 — 44
Lonely Mine 80 30 6 86 2 — 45
Queens Mine 46 20 1 21 20* — 10
Arcturus 94 36 — 43 50* 1 25
Duchess Mine 16 7 2 8 10* — 2
Owl Mine 23 — 4 11 10* — 2
Shagari 33 2 2 11 10* — 5
Golden Valley 20 — — 20 — — 5
Eldorado 26 4 15 10* — 5
* Estimates only.
Generally the Labour vote dearly supported Responsible Government. 
This is usually attributed to the South African government’s suppression of 
the 1922 strike and hostility towards trade unionism; the Labour Party in 
South Africa was allied to the Nationalists in opposition to Smuts. Rhodesian 
Labour was unlikely to be willing to be used as a pawn in Smuts’s game.42 3 
Local organization of trade unions in Rhodesia from 1916 had similarly 
strengthened opposition to exploitation by capitalist mining and other com­
panies, including the Company government, and was unlikely therefore to 
submit to their pressure and propaganda to join the Union. Other factors 
were more directly economic, for wages in Rhodesia were on average ten 
per cent higher than in the South, with salaries below £1000 per annum 
exempt from income tax in Rhodesia.
The position of the railwaymen was initially similar to the rest of the 
Labour group, but altered radically just before the referendum. Antipathy to 
the Union Government was originally strong; Keller, the Secretary of the 
Rhodesian Railways Workers Union, reflected general opinions in his com­
ments on the labour record of Smuts:
42 ‘Unknown’ figures are from The Independent, 3 Nov. 1922. The first returns in the 
Table are polling-station returns and there are therefore no ‘unknown’ votes.
43 Capitalists in South Africa favoured Rhodesia’s entry, Hist. Mss Colin, NE1/1/1, 
Newton to Coghlan, 16 Nov. 1922.
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General Smuts has been held up by the Capitalistic press as a 
saviour of nations . . . [but] the foot-steps of the Prime Minister 
drip with blood. In 1913 the strike and shooting followed by the 
illegal deportations of labour leaders . . . The only crime of these 
labour leaders was that they struck for a living wage . . . The next 
was the native trouble at Port Elizabeth, which required more 
shooting; then Bulhoek, which ‘victory’ was won by more shooting.
Now the Rand trouble — shooting once more . . . These are the 
usual tactics employed by this great(?) statesman to educate the 
working man.44
On his return from the delegation to Smuts, Keller commented that he was: 
keenly disappointed with the results, and more than ever convinced 
that entry into Union would be detrimental to the people of Rho­
desia in general and fatal to the interests of Rhodesian Railwaymen 
in particular.45
He considered the tone of the discussions vague and insincere; the right of 
strike was restricted by the Railway and Harbour Services Act of 1912; 
promotion would be based on bilingualism; men were subject to ‘Double 
Trial’ — a trial by a Railway Board of Enquiry as well as by the court of 
law; and there was no guarantee that salaries would remain at the higher 
Rhodesian level. A heated correspondence was carried on in the press 
columns between Keller, Stewart and Unionist sympathizers, and initially the 
South African terms lent weight to their criticisms of Union. The position 
of railwaymen would depend on when the existing railway companies were 
liquidated, after which their conditions would be the same as those of rail­
way servants in the Union, although pension rights would be secured.46 The 
railwaymen were not satisfied with this, and after a petition was mounted, 
it was later ascertained that the conditions pertaining to civil servants would 
be extended to the railway employees.47 The certainty that the railway system 
would be taken over by the South African government was not countered 
by a similar assurance from the R.G.A. who could only promise to guarantee 
the accrued rights of railway servants in the event of a Responsible Govern­
ment take-over of the railways.48 Since it was not certain that the purchase 
of the railways would be an immediate object, reassurances of this kind 
failed to convince some of the railwaymen of the advantages of Responsible 
Government.49 However, the majority appeared to continue their support 
for the R.G.A.; a vote of confidence was passed in the R.G.A. almost 
unanimously at a public meeting of railwaymen in Bulawayo as late as the
44 Rhodesian Railway Review (April 1922), 13.
46 Ibid., 11 (emphasis in original).
46 British South Africa Company, Government Gazette, 31 July 1922.
47 Bui. Chron., 3 Oct. 1922, General Manager’s Circular No. 162; see also ibid., 21 
Oct. 1922.
4e Hist. Mss Colin, RH8/1/1/11 [Umtali, 4 June-19 Oct. 1922], R.G.A. Salisbury 
to R.G.A. Umtali, 11 Oct. 1922.
49 Bui. Chon., 3 and 14 Oct. 1922, letters from “Clavis’ and ‘Also an Anonymous 
Railway Clerk’.
6 October. On 27 October, polling day, The Bulawayo Chronicle commented 
that while:
the R.R.W.U. leaders have done their utmost to stampede the men 
in favour of R.G. . . . recently there has been a turnover of railway- 
men to Union, and today the Unionists claim that a large majority 
of railway votes are going their way.
This might merely have been an electioneering tactic, but is borne out by the 
results shown in Table VI. The turnover was attributed by the Resident 
Commissioner to the tour of the railway line by two emissaries from the South 
African Railways,50 one of whom was Sir William Hoy’s (General Manager 
of South African Railways) Personal Secretary.51
Unfortunately little is known of the propaganda so successfully used by 
these men, for the meetings were a 11 private, but it was sufficient to swing 
the vote of Bulawayo’s ‘railway suburb’, Raylton, to Union (Table VI). 
However, it was probably related to wage rates, which were in fact only 
marginally lower than in Rhodesia (a difference of 3s. 3d. per day), but 
which was compensated for by the ‘bonus’ system of payment for piece-work 
on which basis most of the South African men were employed.52 Prospects 
for promotion were better in the larger organization, and the security afforded 
from the point of view both of employment and pensions was also attractive. 
In contrast, Responsible Government offered promises of reduced railway 
rates; Downie and other speakers estimated reductions of £500000 in ex­
penditure, which raised doubts regarding the profitability of the railways 
under the R.G.A., and the fear that this would entail longer hours and reduced 
pay.53
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Table VI54
VOTING ANALYSIS : RAILWAY SUBURBS
Polling Station
For
R.G.
For
Union Artisan Railway Clerical
Profes­
sional Other
South Suburbs* 104 
Bulawayo South 
excluding Raylton
113
342 136 177 140 475
Raylton 196 214 71 203 59 10 43
•Apparently a return from one polling station only.
SORC/3/1/125, 785, R-C. to Imperial Secretary, 16 Oct. 1922. 
si The Independent, 13 Oct. 1922.
52 Bui. Chron., 5 Oct. 1922.
53 Ibid., 6 Oct. 1922, editorial; 14 Oct. 1922, letters.
54 It has not been possible to separate the railway vote in Salisbury as the results for 
Salisbury’s ‘railway suburbs’ are not obtainable, while no analysis at all of polling stations 
has been found for Umtali.
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Although a substantial railway population was registered in the Wankie 
district (Table V) where the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of Responsible 
Government, it is unlikely in view of the low poll that the railwaymen, most 
of whom were resident along the main line from Bulawayo to Wankie, voted 
at this station.55
The second major occupational group, the agricultural, similarly ex­
perienced division and a change from the voting pattern of 1920. It will be 
noted from Table I that only 40 per cent of the agricultural community were 
expected to vote for Responsible Government, even though this was tradition­
ally the anti-company sector, and had led all movements to end Chartered 
rule and establish self-government.56 The R.G.A. was originally a ‘farmers 
party’ and many of its leading figures were still farmers. The relatively low 
proportion expected to support it can be attributed to two reasons: firstly, the 
fact that the predominantly farming Afrikaans community voted for Union 
in 1922 in contrast to 1920; and secondly, that although the predominantly 
maize-growing areas in North Mashonaland continued to support Responsible 
Government, the ranchers and tobacco farmers of Eastern Mashonaland, the 
Midlands and Matabeleland appear to have opted for Union.
In 1920 the Afrikaners were instructed by the National Party in South 
Africa to vote for the R.G.A., but despite the continued opposition of the 
Nationalists to the entry of Rhodesia into the Union,57 no such instruction 
was given in 1922. A suggestion that this be sought was vetoed by Coghlan.58 
Many Afrikaans people were also to be found in the ranks of the R.G.A. in 
1920, and the clearest indication of the changed circumstances came with the 
resignation of L. P. Raaff, the well-respected grandson of a famous Pioneer, 
on the grounds that ‘the antipathy of nationality is an openly avowed R.G. 
platform plank’.59 This was supported by evidence from R.G.A. agents: 
one commented that ‘those who are leaving R.G. tell me they are doing 
so because they believe there is a strong anti-Dutch feeling among the majority 
of Britishers’.60 So much was made of the fear of Afrikaner nationalism 
succeeding in South Africa that the R.G.A. in their determination to retain
Unlike Raylton, where railwaymen were 90 per cent British, the gangers registered 
at Wankie were mostly Afrikaans and therefore even more .likely to have voted for 
Union.
56 Murray, The Governmental System, 66, has incorrectly assumed that the alliance 
between the R.G.A. and the Rhodesia Agricultural Union continued in 1922.
57 Rh. Her., 4 July and 15 Sept. 1922.
5s Hist. Mss Colin, RH 8/1/3 (General Secretary, 2 June - 17 Oct. 1922), Monckton 
to Renniker. 2 Aug. 1922; RH8/1/5 [Assistant General Secretary, Rhodesian Party, 
31 Oct. 1912 [19221 - 21 Feb. 19241, Eickhoff to Thornton, 17 Jan. 1923.
59 Rh. Her., 2 Oct. 1922. letter; Hist. Mss Colin, GI1/1/1 [Papers of Albert Giese : 
Correspondence and Other Papers : General, 20 May 1895 - 8 May 1938], Zutphen to 
Giese. 10 July 1922.
so Hist. Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/5 (Marandellas, 14 May - 23 Oct. 1922), Monckton to 
Renniker, 16 Oct. 1922.
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the ‘British’ character of Rhodesia, became openly racialist themselves, 
alienating their former supporters, for whom Responsible Government was 
now less desirable than Union, however much Rhodesia’s entry might aid 
Smuts. The occasional acknowledgement by the R.G.A. of the seriousness 
of this situation did not result in any action being taken to counteract it,61 
Voting in areas densely populated by Afrikaners favoured Union (Table VII); 
the R.G.A. agent in Melsetter reported that ‘Chipinga is a Nationalist strong­
hold and of the 87 votes polled, 13 possibly 14 were for R.G.\ and that in 
Melsetter, ‘Out of 33 that polled here I can safely say 11 were R.G. The 
rest were in favour of Union’.62 Enkeldoorn, the other major Afrikaans centre, 
also voted in favour of Union, and it is noticeable that the electoral districts 
with large minorities of Afrikaans voters scored low on the Responsible 
Government poll (Tables III and VII), namely Eastern, Midlands, Victoria, 
and to some extent Marandellas.
Table VII
VOTING ANALYSIS : AFRIKAANS AREAS
Area
For
R.G.
For
Union Farming Other
Afri­
kaners
Total
Voters
Chipinga 13 74 '
Melsetter 11 22 V 250 83 238 333
Enkeldoorn 80 133
(Charter District) 162 233
Wildebeeste
Laagte 1 40 41 — 40 41
There is little doubt that fear of Afrikaner Nationalism contributed to the 
success of the R.G.A.; Chaplin attributed the result of the referendum partly 
to ‘anti-Dutch feeling, especially among the women’,63 the reverse side of 
the coin was the loss of the ‘Dutch’ vote.
The Afrikaans vote in favour of Union to some extent explains the 
dramatic change in the political attitude of the agricultural sector, since the 
majority of the Afrikaners in the country farmed, and this in itself could 
account for almost half the Union vote of 5 989.64 This does not, however,
si Hist Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/1, Hepburn to Renniker, 8 Oct. 1922; RH8/1/1/17 
[Party Supporters, 2 Sept. - 30 Nov. 1922], Myers to Renniker, 30 Oct. 1922; 
RH8/1/1/11, Mrs Tawse Jollie to Renniker, 18 July 1922.
62 Hist. Mss Colin. RH8/1/1/17, Gilbert to Renniker, 30 Oct. 1922.
63 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/1, Chaplin to Smuts, 30 Oct. 1922.
64 There were 6 537 adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church in 1921, but a high 
proportion of these would be children, and not all adults were registered voters in view 
of the literacy qualifications, Report of the Director of Census . . . 1921, Table XVI.
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TABLE VIII™
VOTING ANALYSIS : FARMING DISTRICTS
Polling Station For R.G. For Union Unknown Farming
M a r a n d e l l a s : 433 443 744
Headlands 16 57 60*
Marandellas 63 64
Inoro 14 12 26*
Li ft on Farm 3 34 35*
Wedza 14 14 24
Makwiro 6 20 4 45
Beatrice 27 26 3 48
Sa l is b u r y  D is t r ic t : 845 629 422
Nyabira 2 55 50*
V ic t o r ia : 626 585 683
Vlakplaats 2 20 20*
Zishumba 4 23 25*
Danga 8 14 6*
Chibi 8 10 8*
W e s t e r n : 611 419 458
Bembesi 2 20 17*
Nyamandhlovu 10 15 67
Marula 8 11 18
* Estimates only.
explain the entire shift away from Responsible Government by the farming 
community. Results and estimates from polling stations in the Marandellas, 
Victoria and Western districts, where examination of the voters rolls shows 
the number of Afrikaners to be comparatively low, indicates that the vote 
still went in favour of Union (Table VIII) in certain districts. The first feature 
these areas have in common is that none are maize-growing areas; the 
Marandellas districts specialized in tobacco, and the remainder were primarily 
ranching areas. Prices for cattle had slumped in 1922, and cattle were vir­
tually unsaleable, yet the drought made the sale of surplus animals an urgent 
necessity. The local market was saturated, and wheat a market was found in 
the Congo, Northern Rhodesia restricted the passage of Southern Rhodesian 
cattle on health grounds; the nearest and readiest market, Kimberley and the 
Rand, was similarly restricted.65 6 With no facilities for the export of tinned 
or frozen meat, Rhodesian cattlemen looked to the Union as a solution for 
their serious economic problems. To a certain extent the fact that many large 
mining and land-owning companies were also involved in ranching is a con-
65 This Table excludes maize-growing districts, which are included in Table IX.
66 See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Committee of Enquiry in Respect of the 
Cattle Industry of Southern Rhodesia (Sessional Papers, A15, 1923).
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tributary factor, but secondary to conditions caused by the drought and 
slump.
The slump, of course, was not limited to cattle prices and seriously 
affected tobacco and maize producers who similarly experienced marketing 
difficulties. The principal market for Rhodesian tobacco was South Africa, 
which by the 1920s was thought to have reached the limit of its import re­
quirements. Tobacco had not previously been widely grown in South Africa 
except the darker pipe grades, but in the 1920s attempts were made to foster 
production and a tax was imposed on Rhodesian cigarette tobacco.67 Rho­
desia’s entry into the Union would remove restrictions and help to solve the 
marketing problem. Marandellas was the principal tobacco producing district 
and was the only constituency to vote in favour of Union.68 Nyabira was simi­
larly the centre of a tobacco area north-west of Salisbury.
Maize on the other hand was produced on a large scale in South Africa, 
as well as in Rhodesia, and the bulk of the Rhodesian crop was exported over­
seas rather than to South Africa. Entry into the Union might not upset 
existing marketing arrangements, but maize-growers feared that, as railway 
rates from South Africa were lower than these from Rhodesia to South 
Africa, the lucrative local Rhodesian market would be swamped in times 
of surplus by cheap South African maize; this section of the farming com­
munity was perhaps the only group in Rhodesia who would not welcome 
the lower South African railway rates.
Map Legend
NAMES OF NUMBERED MINES
1. Shamva 12. Kimberley 23. Iron Duke
2. Left Bower 13. Kingsley 24. Yellow
3. Right Bower Hoard Jacket
4. Chookee 14. Slam 25. Alice
5. Crusader 15. Alliance Ext. 26. Golden Shaft
6. New Brixton 16. Alliance 27. Leopards Vlei
7. Montdor 17. Trio 28. Alpes
8. Red Dragon 18. Top
9. Un-named 19. Tiptop
10. Asp 20. Joking
11. Prince of 21. Joker
Wales 22. Jumbo
67 Rh. Her., 13 Oct. 1922, letter from A. Pearson; E. A. Walker A History of South 
Africa (London, Longmans, 1947), 604; Rhodesian ‘scrap’ tobacco was totally pro­
hibited in 1925.
68 It is possible that some voters in this district (the only one to return a Responsible 
Government candidate in 1914) were also influenced by the conversion of McChlery 
to Union, although by itself this cannot account for the massive swing to Union. 
Marandellas as a constituency was abolished in 1923; the re-delimitation split it be­
tween Northern and Eastern districts.
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Although marketing instability of all crops had existed in Rhodesia 
from 1920 as a result of the post-war depression, the seriousness of the situa­
tion had been heightened by the unprecedented drought of 1922, when there 
was an almost total failure of the normal annual rains. The insecurity of the 
fanning community was increased and helped to convince many farmers 
that Union held the better prospects for them. The maize growers’ vote, 
however, remained for Responsible Government, as is shown by a survey of 
the voting pattern for the Mazoe District (Map and Table IX), part of the 
Northern Electoral District and the principal maize-growing area in the 
country; this makes it clear that the two mining areas, Tafuna and Shamva, 
supported Responsible Government and that the majority of farmers in this 
district, with the exception of Benridge Farm, continued to sympathize with 
Responsible Government,69 for economic reasons in addition to other factors 
such as fear of loss of their labour to South Africa.70 *Maize growers therefore 
lacked any incentive to vote for Union.
Table UN­
VOTING ANALYSIS : MAZOE DISTRICT
Polling Station*
For
R.G.
For
Union
Un­
known Total Farming
Mining/
Artisan Other Total
Mazoe 60 28 2 90 123 49 55 227
Passaford 19 12 — 31 29 2 12 31
Concession 59 12 4 75 58 6 6 70
Glendale 38 30 4 72 62 7 5 74
Tafuna 20 16 7 43 10 41 2 53
Shamva Mine 161 120 17 298 40 270 104 414
Benridge Farm 5 14 3 22 22 2 — 24
Umvukwe 21 4 — 25 25 2 — 27
Ranch
656 920
Bindura 147
803
Other polling stations (Mazoe, Shamva) 117
920
* See Map
69 Hist. Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/9, Martin to Renniker, 4 Sept. 1922.
7° Rh. Her., 20 Oct. 1922, letter from J. Mowbray of Shamva.
7' Although this district contains the most complete list of polling-station returns and 
estimates, no return for Bindura was included, and it is apparent from the low polls at 
turns are also omitted.
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Next to the artisan vote, the womens’ vote was seen by the Resident 
Commissioner to be predominantly in favour of Responsible Government, a 
view with which Chaplin and others agreed.72 Undoubtedly a high proportion 
voted the same way as their husbands, but this was not always the case; the 
most celebrated instance of divided loyalties was that of Godfrey Huggins, a 
later Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, whose wife was an active R.G.A. 
supporter while he favoured Union.73 A noticeable feature of the voters 
rolls is the frequency with which married women who qualified on their 
husbands’ salaries were registered, while their husbands were not. It will be 
seen from Table XI that if their votes are apportioned in accordance with 
the estimated 75: 25 split, an accurate return is obtained. McChlery and the 
R.G.A. had championed the cause of women’s suffrage, which was then 
introduced in the Legislative Council by Coghlan; and the continued support 
by the R.G.A. for women's rights and the organization of women voters74 
contributed to a continued loyalty. Certainly the ‘pandering’ of the R.G.A. 
to the women’s vote was deplored by some Unionists.75 The fame and 
popularity of Mrs Tawse Jollie might also have contributed to this support. 
Although Chaplin considered the women ‘anti-Dutch’, assertions regarding 
their stronger racialism or lack of economic sense are less ascertainable 
features of their widespread sympathy for Responsible Government. A 
more likely explanation lies in the fact that South African women did not 
have the franchise (which was obtained only in 1930); and although Rho­
desians were assured that the women would not be robbed of their vote on 
entry to the Union, such a fear existed and it would certainly not be possible 
to return female members to the House of Assembly.76
The higher percentage of Responsible Government votes in the urban 
constituencies reflects not only the concentration of women in the towns, but 
also the support of civil servants and clerical workers, who were of course 
also concentrated in urban areas (Table X).
One of the principal reasons for the formation of the Public Services 
Association in 1919 was to protect the rights of civil servants in the event 
of a change of government. In addition to the guarantees required of the 
R.G.A. for maintenance of existing conditions and rights, from the Unionists 
the Public Services Association demanded security in regard to bilingualism
72  Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11, McDonald to Malcolm, 13 Nov. 1922.
73 Gann and Gelfand, Huggins, 60.
74 See correspondence in Hist. Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/4 (Gwelo, 24 June-25 Sept. 
1922); RH 8/1/1/6 (Mazoe, Glendale and Bindura, 1 July - 12 Oct. 1922); CH3/1/1 
(Papers of Kathleen Esther Charter : Unpublished Articles : . . . Reminiscences from 
1897 to 1939).
75 Hist. Mss Colin, GI1/1/1. Major Jesser Cooper to Giese, 4 Sept. 1923.
76 Hist. Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/19 (General, 3 June 1919 - 25 Nov. 1922), Mrs C. 
Blomefield to Coghlan, 14 Sept. 1922.
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and the right of retirement with full pension benefits on transfer.77 Since both 
parties pledged support for the demands made of them, the issue of bilingual­
ism and the possibility of transfer outside Rhodesia were the deciding fac­
tors for the majority of public servants; and this resulted in the majority 
of the predominantly English-speaking junior civil servants supporting Res­
ponsible Government, which represented the greater security for their 
careers. J. G. McDonald reported after the referendum that ‘a large majority 
of civil servants and police voted R.G.’,78 and Chaplin in fact considered 
members of the Public Services Association to be ‘R.G. extremists’.79
The vote of white-collar workers was also attributed to Responsibla 
Government by Chaplin,80 and similarly contributed to the large majorities 
returned from urban constituencies (Table X).
Table X
VOTING ANALYSIS : URBAN CONSTITUENCIES
For
R.G.
For
Union
Un- Public 
known Service
Cler­
ical
Art­
isan
Rail­
ways
Profes­
sional
Com­
merce Other
Bulawayo
North 826 390 206 277 268 68 249 322 228
Bulawayo
South 955 538 83 236 413 339 150 148 368
Salisbury
Town 894 507 253 326 275 160 200 406 125
Avondale 175 38 65 79 46 35 4 63 46 15
It can be seen from Table X that the railway vote alone cannot explain 
the number of pro-Union votes, and once again the Resident Commissioner’s 
estimate, that the ‘professional’ vote would be split 50:50 with 20 per cent 
of the commercial community also supporting Union, accounts for this to 
some extent, although it is felt that a more accurate return is obtained if the 
latter is increased to 40 per cent. In the light of the referendum results, a 
revised estimate has been made of the voting pattern, the accuracy of which 
is demonstrated in two constituencies (Table XI).
77 See correspondence in Hist. Mss Colin, SR1/1/1/S (The Southern Rhodesia 
Public Services Association : Correspondence and Other Papers : General, 28 Feb. 1919- 
28 Dec. 1936 : Change of Government, 18 June 1919-12 April. 1923), Murray, The Gov­
ernmental System, 29, gives a full account of the conditions but is incorrect in assuming 
an actual ‘alliance’ of the Public Service Association with the R.G.A.
78 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/2/11, McDonald to Malcolm, 13 Nov. 1922.
79 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/1, Chaplin to Smuts, 30 Oct. 1922.
so Ibid.
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Table X I
REVISED ESTIMATE OF VOTING PATTERN
Estimated. % for Bulawayo North Voters Bulawayo South Voters
Occupation R.G. Union Total R.G. Union Total R.G. Union
Public
Services 75 25 206 156 50 83 62 21
Clerical 80 20 277 222 55 236 189 47
Artisan 80 20 268 216 52 413 331 82
Railways 40 60 68 27 41 339 136 203
Professional 50 50 249 124 124 150 75 75
Commerce 60 40 322 193 129 148 89 59
Other 60 40 228 137 91 368 221 147
Women
(unattached)
75 25 103 778 25 --- — —
100% Poll = 1 153 567 1 103 614
A ctual P ercentage P oll:
Bulawayo North 70,5 815 400
Bulawayo South 89,5 949 527
A ctual V otes R ecorded: 826 390 955 538
The comparative accuracy of these estimates would support the argument 
that the greater proportion of the clerical and commercial groups voted in 
favour of Responsible Government. The reduction of the estimate for the 
commercial sector from 80 per cent to 60 per cent not only follows the 
general distribution of Responsible Government and Union votes, but reflects 
the numbers of prominent commercial men found in the ranks of the 
Unionists, such as Johnson, President of the Bulawayo Chamber of Com* 
merce. More important, economic factors do not adequately support a 
higher proportion favouring Responsible Government. Loss of the Rhodes 
Clause on entry into Union would mean higher import duties, but this 
would have been balanced to a great extent by the lower railway rates. Since 
any increased costs would be passed on to customers, neither argument was 
really valid for traders. However, as the majority of traders were locally 
based, or ‘national capitalists’, and had no ties with South African com­
panies, the choice was less controlled by the desire for security of investments, 
which governed the mining companies, and more likely to be influenced by 
the higher tax rates in South Africa from which Rhodesia would only be 
exempt for three years.
Although the African and Coloured voters did not constitute a high 
percentage of the electorate, their vote tended to be against incorporation in 
the Union. Meetings for the Coloured population were held by the R.G.A. at 
which Coghlan and other speakers guaranteed that their rights would not be 
prejudiced by Responsible Government. It was reported that the Coloured
9 4 Ahl ANALYSIS OF THE RHODESIAN REFERENDUM, 1 9 2 2
and Indian people were ‘solid for R.G.’8' and that the latter ‘had promised 
to subscribe handsomely to our funds’.82 The main interests of African voters 
lay not in Responsible Government or Union as such, but in the protection of 
their interests and rights; a petition by the Bantu Vigilance Society requested 
that rights to the franchise be preserved, that the High Commissioner’s in­
fluence should not be impaired, and that provision be made for Native 
Councils.83 Since the Colonial Office retained some control over ‘Native 
Affairs’ under the draft letters patent, but could not guarantee that South 
Africa would maintain the status quo, it is likely that most African voters 
would prefer Responsible Government;84 certainly the R.G.A. reported in 
1923 that the African voters were unanimously for Responsible Government.85 
However, there is a possibility that some division occurred, as reports were 
made of Africans requesting English church members to vote for Union.86 
Missionaries themselves favoured Responsible Government; the Empandeni 
mission in Matabeleland returned no Union votes, while the 11 votes for 
Responsible Government at Melsetter were thought to have come from the 
Mount Selinda Mission.87
Victory was not in fact anticipated by the Rhodesia Union Association 
although McDonald believed that another two months would have made all 
the difference;88 the Unionists claimed to have gained ground after the re­
ferendum, but this was a debateable point.89 Although it had been hoped that 
Smuts’s visit to Rhodesia in August would turn the scales, the considerable 
influence he exerted on the electorate90 was dispelled by October, and his 
last-minute address to the Rhodesian voters, with its strong criticism of the 
letters patent, caused only increased antipathy to Union.
In a post-referendum survey, Chaplin, too, considered that more time 
would have seen a swing to Union, particularly of farmers if the depression 
continued, but:
The real mistake, I think, was made by Churchill when he 
appointed the Buxton Commission and altered Milner’s plan of 
leaving the question of Responsible Government to be voted upon 
at the general election for the Legislative Council which would have 
taken place in the ordinary course next year . . .  As regards the 
campaign itself, — the Unionists had the most money but in Salis­
bury at any rate their organisation was none too good and as a party 
— though some of their people worked hard — they lacked en­
thusiasm. They were much handicapped by want of effective
si Hist. Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/9, Martin to Renniker, 4 Sept. 1922.
82 Hist. Mss Colin, R H 8/1/1/1, R.G.A. Salisbury to R.G.A. Bulawayo, 4 Oct. 1922; 
CH8/2/1. Chaplin to Smuts. 30 Oct. 1922.
93 RC/3/1/114 (1921), 1516, dated Aug. 1921 end. in R.C. to H.C., 22 Dec. 1921.
84 Pn. Her., 31 Mar ' >22. letter from A. Twala.
85 Hist. Mss Colin, RH8/1/5, R.G.A. to Coghlan, 4 Apr. 1923.
86 Rh. Her.. 13 Oct. 1922, report by Etheridge in Rhodesian Church Record; Hist 
Mss Colin. CH8/2/1, Chaplin to Smuts, 30 Oct. 1922.
67 Hist. Mss Colin, RH8/1/1/17, Gilgank to Renniker, 30 Oct. 1922. 
as Hist. Mss Colin. CH8/2/2/9, McDonald to Chaplin, 21 Oct. 1922.
89 Hist. Mss Colin, NE1/1/1, Coghlan to Newton, 25 Nov. 1922.
so Hist. Mss Colin, RH8/1/1/11, Renniker to Mrs Tawse Jollie, 17 Aug. 1922.
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speakers . . . They put their case soberly and truthfully, but they did 
not do enough to counteract the aggressive and frequently un­
scrupulous tactics of the other side . . . Their method of putting the 
case seemed to be based on the assumption that the electors generally 
were reasonable and reckoning people, the support of such people 
they did as a rule secure, but unfortunately these are only a minority 
of the electorate.91
The R.G.A. were equally suspicious of the tactics of the Unionists, but they 
do seem to have had the advantage of more vociferous supporters, and the 
use of ‘trained hecklers’.92
It has been seen that company managers and other ‘responsible’ sections 
of the community (who had favoured Union in 1920 and before the terms 
were known) led the Unionist movement and were supported by the railway- 
men (who were won over by the terms) and Afrikaans farmers. Artisans 
generally and white-collar workers favoured Coghlan and self-government 
in preference to the leadership of little-known mining company men and 
domination by the South.
Economic considerations were of vital importance, but, in addition, self- 
government held the greater appeal; however generous Smuts’s terms may 
have been, Responsible Government gave Rhodesia a chance to prove itself on 
its own, instead of moving straight from rule by the Company to domination 
by the strong South African states. Moreover it did not preclude Union should 
Responsible Government fail, but if it succeeded, the possible menace of 
Afrikaner nationalism and bilingualism would have been avoided. Rhodesia’s 
white settlers were predominantly English-speaking, and their ‘jingoism’ 
found expression as much in this fear of bilingualism as in the wish to keep 
Rhodesia a loyal part of the Empire. As a high percentage of this English- 
speaking population were in fact from South Africa,93 an interesting feature 
of the referendum is that their vote was also divided; it was reported that 
‘of the old Colonials, the Cape people are as a body in favour of Union, 
with some outstanding exceptions, but those from Natal are all against it.’94
The war was over with the referendum, although some battles remained 
to be fought before the actual achievement of Responsible Government on 
1 October 1923. However, Coghlan’s problems were not exclusively connected 
with constitutional questions, and an equally important feature of the years 
1923 and 1924 was the continued struggle against the Unionists, and even 
more serious, against divisions within the ranks of the Rhodesian Responsible 
Government Party itself.
s' Hist Mss Colin, CH8/2/1, Chaplin to Smuts, 30 Oct. 1922.
92 Hist Mss. Colin. R H 8/1/1/3 (Gatooma, 15 Sent-16 Oct. 1922), R.G.A. Salisbury 
to R.G.A. Gatooma, 29 Sept. 1922; RH8/1/1/13 (Victoria, 19-29 Sept. 1922), R.G.A. 
Gatooma to R.G.A. Salisbury. 23 Oct. 1922.
93 The 1921 Census was the first to show more settlers to have been born in the 
Union than in Great Britain (11 634 to 10 544), but the majority of the South Africans 
were of British origin, Report of the Director of Census . . . 1921, Table XXI.
94 Hist. Mss Colin. M I1/1/1 (Papers of Sir William Henry Milton ; Correspondence 
| and Other Papers : Official, [c.1896] - 8 May 1930), Tredgold to Milton, 31 Aug. 1922.
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The Unionists did not immediately abandon their attempts to subvert 
the Responsible Government movement after the referendum; McDonald 
informed the Company that:
General Smuts strongly urges that Unionist Association should be 
kept go ng. He. says he will continue to give us his whole hearted 
support. It is his intention to keep his offer to your Company open . . .  
Negotiations between your Board and Union Government should 
not be allowed to drop. Can you move in this. He will I think keep 
our Press right. He gives R.G. two years of life only if things are 
well handled.95
Malcolm however advised against the proposed policy of subverting the new 
government.96 The Rhodesia Union Association was obliged by the B.S.A. 
Company’s attitude to change its tactics. McDonald clearly set out the new 
policy of ex-Unionists in an address to mine and land-owning companies, 
which was to ‘do what we can irrespective of party to return as many sound 
thinking men as we can’ in the elections of 1924.97
Some of the candidates thus appointed were returned as Independents, 
such as Sir Ernest Montagu, a former Company official, while ex-Unionists 
infiltrated the Rhodesian Party (as the Rhodesian Responsible Government 
Party was renamed) itself. In the 1924 elections successful Rhodesian Party 
candidates included C. F. Birney, the General Manager of the Rhodesia 
Railways, ‘Wankie’ Thomson, W. M. Longden, and G. M. Huggins (all ex- 
Unionists) and the Company’s former treasurer. Sir Percy Fynn. In a by- 
election later in 1924, Percy Inskipp, the former Manager of the Company’s 
commercial interests in Rhodesia and Director of the Company, was also 
returned for the Rhodesian Party.
As early as 1921 McDonald had been advised that ‘if R.G. did happen in 
Rhodesia our party should not let the R.G. party nobble Labour . . .  the 
party which stood best with Labour would hold the reins’.99 It was naturally 
impossible for the Unionists to attempt to win Labour over, but since serious 
divisions were appearing in the Labour-R.G.A. coalition, they were able 
to take advantage of Coghlan’s own desire to drop Labour and take up his 
offer of a ‘best man’ government. Coghlan in fact had no wish to alienate 
the ‘Companies’,99 but he showed some caution in regard to the Union policy 
and certainly did not ‘intend to lose the support of Labour until the Unionist 
crowd have shown by their deeds as well as professions, that they have drop­
ped Union.’100 The Union party was therefore abandoned, after a failure to
as Hist. Mss Colin, C H 8/2/2/9, McDonald (Charter, Cape Town) to Malcolm, 
telegram. 28 Nov. 1922.
96 Ibid., Malcolm to McDonald, 20 Dec. 1922.
97 Hist. Mss Colin, M013/1/1 [Papers of Howard Unwin Moffat : Correspondence : 
Political], J. G. McDonald, ‘Memorandum re the New Political Situation . . . ’,30  
July [ 192] 3.
°8 Hist. Mss Colin, CH8/2/1, McDonald to Ludlow, 7 July 1921.
*9 Hist. Mss Colin, NE1/1/1, Coghlan to Newton, 14 Nov. 1921. 
mo Ibid., Coghlan to Newton, 25 Nov. 1921.
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reconstruct it under a new name, on which H. T. Longden commented that 
‘we should lose the Dutch vote. The Railway vote would also probably go’.10'
In the meantime Coghlan had to tread warily in his abandonment of 
Labour. Coghlan realized that his party’s weakness lay:
not in the strength of our opponents, but in the lack of homogeneity 
in our party and it is going to tax all our ingenuity and tact to 
avoid the sectional danger . . . Being an advanced Liberal myself, I 
hope I shall be able to make some impression on the Labour element, 
but I fear that both Keller and Stewart are likely to be uncompromis­
ing.10 02
Yet despite Coghlan’s claim to ‘advanced Liberal’ views, his sincerity in 
regard to his expressed desire to retain the Labour link is questionable. His 
own attitude to Labour could not have helped to improve relations between 
the R.G.A. and Labour; he refused to consider Stewart for a Cabinet post,103 
and when Theo Haddon (Manager of the Globe & Phoenix mine) was refused 
permission to stand for election, commented that it would be as well for 
Haddon’s company to realize that ‘it is highly desirable that men like Haddon 
should be encouraged to stand whenever they can get the party support 
rather than that we should be forced to take other men, however good, such 
as labourites’.104
Squabbling with the Labour Party over delimitation of ‘party seats’ 
arose, and Coghlan stated in February 1924 that ‘it was utterly impossible 
for them to make any sort of alliance with the Labour Party’.105 Rather than 
directing policy towards a reconciliation of differences with Labour, the Rho­
desian Party concentrated on winning over ex-Unionists, a policy with which 
McDonald’s views were in accord.106
In the event, the Labour Party put up candidates independently of the 
Rhodesian Party, but secured only 14,7 per cent of the vote, and did not 
succeed in taking a single seat. This failure of the Labour Party to attract 
support from the considerable working-class population amongst the settlers 
can be attributed to three causes: the propaganda107 and popularity of the 
Rhodesian Party, which had won self-government for the country under 
Coghlan; the desire of the settlers to see unanimity replace the former political 
divisions in order that Responsible Government succeed; and lastly, the 
decline of Trade Unions by 1924, as the Labour Party lacked the influence 
it might otherwise have had with the support of a strong trade union element.
101 Hist. Mss Colin, M013/1/1, Secret memo, to Major Jesser Cooper, end. in Coghlan 
to Newton, 9 Nov. 1923.
102 Hist. Mss Colin, NE1/1/1, Coghlan to Newton, 5 Dec. 1922.
>03 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
'os Hist. Mss Colin. RH8/1/5. Coghlan to Rhodesia Labour Party. 17 Oct. 1923; 
RH8/4/2 (Minutes : Central Executive, 20 Dec. 1922-15 July 1938), Minutes, 23 Feb. 
, 1924.
| 106 This policy had first been proposed by J. W. Downie, Hist. Mss Colin, LE3/1/2 
l (Papers of William Muter Leggate : Correspondence : Miscellaneous, 1 May 1919-16 
I Apr. 1939), Downie to Leggate. 26 Dec. 1922.
I  io7 Murray, The Governmental System, 212.
With the Unionists converted, and Labour divided and helpless, the re­
maining problems were the farmers and disgruntled members of the Rho­
desian Party itself,'08 for discontent was rife after Coghlan’s distribution of 
the five portfolios.
The difficulties with the farmers were not overcome by Coghlan, whose 
ministry rarely showed much sympathy to fanning demands. To some extent 
this rift had reflected the personal conflict between Coghlan and Fletcher, and 
Coghlan and McChlery, who had been disappointed in the new government’s 
failure to amend the Gold Belt title.
Coghlan and the Rhodesian Party survived these sectional splits, and 
also survived the more serious challenge of Frank Johnson’s Progressive Party, 
which secured 30 per cent of the vote in the 1928 elections, and which was 
a strong threat even before Coghlan’s death in 1927. Support for the opposition 
party resulted from widespread dissatisfaction with the government by this 
date. So much had been expected of Responsible Government by the many 
diverse elements which supported it in 1922 that many groups were dis­
appointed — not only the farmers, but also the civil servants and commercial 
groups, as well as individuals whose political ambitions had not been realized; 
amongst the Progressives were F. L. Hadfield, F. P. Mennell, H. Bertin and 
R. D. Gilchrist, all former supporters of the Rhodesian Party. With the death 
of Coghlan, and the subsequent mediocre leadership of Moffat, the Rhodesian 
Party did not survive the 1933 elections.
Responsible Government had been achieved and, despite predictions 
to the contrary, it succeeded. However, considerable changes had been seen 
in the structure of support for the movement; it was initiated by the fanners, 
who with the support of white-collar workers and Labour, returned R.G.A. 
members to the 1920 Legislative Council. The referendum of 1922 saw further 
changes; farming support was lost to some extent, but the Labour vote \yas 
still an important factor in the vote in favour of Responsible Government 
despite the loss of the railwaymen. The party had become that of ‘the man 
in the street’ The later changes in name, to Rhodesian Responsible Govern­
ment Party and then Rhodesian Party, meant more, however, than a super­
ficial alteration in nomenclature. Coghlan had liked neither the farmers nor 
Labour, and under his leadership from 1919 the alliance with these groups 
was broken; by 1924 it had been replaced by a firm association with former 
Unionists and the mining sector — the ‘responsible’ sectors of the community. 
Although economic causes can be seen to have been the major force behind 
the voting pattern in the referendum, Coghlan himself was primarily res­
ponsible for the subsequent alteration in the structure of support for his 
party. As a result, Responsible Government did not prove to be the radical 
and destructive ‘poor man’s’ government that had been feared, and it con­
tinued many of the traditions established by the Company.
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'os Hist. Mss Colin, C08/1/3 (Papers of Sir Charles Patrick John Coghlan : Corres­
pondence : Personal, 4 June 1881-6 Mar. 1927), Coghlan to sister, 1 Jan. 1924; 
NE1/1/1, Coghlan to Newton, 31 Dec. 1923.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
Institute o f 
Development Studies
